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Abstract: This study makes the following contributions to the study of 
the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it 
adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova’s (2008) distinction between clien-
telistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these 
authors classification of patrons’ motivations for making appointments, 
specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin 
America’s presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy 
of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees’ play vis-à-
vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration – one 
that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. 
Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of 
patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administra-
tions. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the find-
ings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential 
powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors asso-
ciated with the respective governments’ own political projects. The arti-
cle concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation 
of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-
presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-
democratic one in Uruguay.  
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One of the more important political factors affecting the quality of pub-
lic institutions in Latin America is the colonization of the state apparatus 
by politically appointed public sector employees. In a classical study of 
the Latin American state, one published more than 40 years ago, Doug-
las Chalmers (1977) argued that the enduring quality of Latin American 
politics in the twentieth century was not a particular form of regime but 
the politicized quality of the state. He further posited that being “in 
power” was particularly important, because it gave leaders extensive 
patronage opportunities and the authority to establish government pro-
grams to benefit existing supporters as well as to attract new ones. Much 
has changed in Latin America since Chalmers first published his work, 
but the argument about the politicized nature of the state has neverthe-
less stood the test of time (Philip 2003; Spiller et al. 2008).  
Scholars have used the terms “patronage” and “clientelism” inter-
changeably (Piattoni 2001: 4), to signify the exchange of public sector 
jobs for political support (Chubb 1982; Geddes 1994). This assimilation 
has, however, been challenged by analytical distinctions between clien-
telistic and nonclientelistic modalities of patronage (Kopecký, Scherlis, 
and Spirova 2008; Piattoni 2001), and by awareness of the alternate roles 
that appointees play in different political environments – and, indeed, 
even within the same public administration (Grindle 2012). And yet, 
there has to date been surprisingly little comparative empirical research 
done about the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America’s 
presidentialist central public administrations – as well as about what 
explains the tangible differences that exist both within and between 
countries.  
This article1 contributes to the study of patronage appointments in 
Latin America’s presidentialist regimes, then, by adopting and adapting 
the definition thereof formulated by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 
(2008). This is done in order to set up a taxonomy of patronage ap-
pointments. It subsequently applies this taxonomy to the study of the 
politics of patronage appointments in Argentina’s and Uruguay’s central 
public administrations under two left-of-center governments, and relates 

1  We wish to acknowledge the contribution of our research assistants Mauro 
Casa González and Tamara Samudio to this research project, and thank them 
for their valuable work. We would like to thank our colleagues at the Instituto 
de Ciencia Política of the Universidad de la República (Uruguay) for their 
comments on earlier versions of this article. 
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the findings uncovered to institutional and agency factors in the two 
countries.  
We assume that the scope of patronage appointments, the power to 
make them, the motives for them, and the roles played by appointees 
themselves are the defining elements of the politics of patronage. We 
argue that the differences in patronage practices in the two countries 
were shaped by institutional variation in their respective presidential 
powers and party systems, as well as by agency factors related specifically 
to the political forces that controlled each government in the period 
under study. We found that the scope of patronage largely confirms the 
impression of two politicized central administrations that were not, how-
ever, characterized by traditional forms of mass clientelism. With this 
common baseline, politicization not only runs deeper in Argentina but 
also worked differently between the two countries generally. In Argenti-
na, patronage was centrally controlled by the presidency in strategic areas 
and by ministers in other ones. In Uruguay, in contrast, patronage was 
largely devolved to the ruling party’s factions with little central interfer-
ence from the presidency. These findings, together with the observable 
differences in the roles played by appointees, present a clear picture of 
two different political systems, two different political projects, and, ulti-
mately, two different modalities of exercising governmental power: a 
hyper-presidentialist, populist, politico-institutional regime in Argentina 
and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: The next section reviews 
the literature on patronage appointments. Section three then defines the 
main concepts, and sets up a taxonomy of patronage practices. The 
fourth section presents and justifies the choice of cases and theoretical 
assumptions. Section five outlines the research design and methodology. 
The sixth section presents the research’s main empirical findings. The 
concluding section discusses institutional and agency explanations for 
the differences in patronage practices between the two countries studied 
here, Argentina and Uruguay.  
 7KH3ROLWLFVRI3DWURQDJH$SSRLQWPHQWV
While there have been a wealth of studies of clientelism in Latin America 
(see, among others, Hilgers 2012; Lazar 2004; Levitsky 2003; Stokes et al. 
2013; Taylor 2004), as a general rule these are mainly interested in ex-
plaining variations in the scope of it (Ames 1977; Geddes 1994; Gordin 
2001; Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009) and/or in investigating 
mechanisms of clientelistic exchange at the subnational level (Oliveros 
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2016; Stokes 2005; Auyero 2000) – with little attention paid to the map-
ping of different patronage practices in central administrations.2 Closer 
to our own research interests here are: Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova’s 
(2008) work on conceptualizing and measuring patronage appointments; 
Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova’s (2012) studies of the politics of patronage 
in European democracies; investigations of political appointments and 
coalition management at the upper levels of the federal government in 
Brazil (Bersch, Praça, and Taylor 2017; Garcia Lopez 2015); Scherlis’s 
(2012) analysis of patronage practices in Argentina as a party-building 
strategy; and, finally, Grindle’s (2012) comparative study of patronage 
and the politics of administrative reform. These studies argue, in com-
mon, that: patronage appointments are controlled and contested by dif-
ferent actors; patrons have different motivations for making appoint-
ments; and, appointees perform a variety of roles within the public ad-
ministration while having different levels of competence. 
In line with Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008), we define pat-
ronage appointments as the power of political actors to discretionally 
install individuals in (nonelective) positions within the public sector, 
irrespective of the motives for the actual appointment, the capabilities of 
the appointee, and the legality of the decision. As Kopecký et al. (2016) 
note, this definition includes patronage appointments that are clientelistic 
in nature as well as others in which appointments are used for purposes 
besides clientelistic exchange. In consequence, we distinguish between 
different types of patronage role and define clientelistic appointments – 
the exchanging of public sector jobs for votes – (Lémarchand 1981; 
Roniger 1994) as only one among a number of different varieties of 
patronage appointment. 
Two clarifications are necessary here to better understand the rela-
tions between clientelism and patronage:  
1) Recruitment to patronage positions defines obligations but not 
necessarily motives and roles, as those who are politically appointed to 
positions in the public sector may be installed there for a variety of rea-
sons other than furthering the patron’s electoral chances (Grindle 2012; 
Johnston 1979; Key 1964; Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012; Müller 
2006). While the politicized and discretional nature of the appointment is 

2  The study of the different roles that patronage appointments play in central 
administrations has received more attention in Europe (Connaughton 2015; 
LSE Group 2012; Askim, Karlsen, and Kolltveit 2017; Kristinsson 2016) than 
in Latin America hitherto. European studies tend, however, to concentrate on 
the narrow category of advisers, while the range of political appointees is in fact 
much broader in Latin America’s politicized central pubic administrations.  
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a shared characteristic with clientelism, patronage ones include appoint-
ments where professional qualifications – rather than just partisan crite-
ria – may have been taken into account (Grindle 2012).  
2) Trust is the essence of patronage. It cuts across the other selec-
tion criteria, and combines with them in a number of different measures. 
It can be personal to the politician or political to the party. Even in cases 
where patronage appointments are made in accordance with the law, 
there is always an asymmetry of power between the patron and the ap-
pointee – as the latter serves at the discretion of the former. This makes 
the position dependent on relations of personal trust, or partisan loyalty, 
between the politician and the appointee (Grindle 2012). 
 0DSSLQJ3DWURQDJH3UDFWLFHV
In order to map practices in Argentina and Uruguay, we look at three 
elements regarded by the comparative literature as crucial for the study 
of the politics of patronage: the scope of appointments; who has the 
power to appoint; and, the patron’s motives for the appointments. We 
use the last of these three as a lens with which to identify the roles played 
by appointees, and from this to construct a taxonomy of patronage ap-
pointments. 
By “scope” we mean the range of state agencies that include pat-
ronage appointments (breadth) and the levels (depth) that the latter reach 
within the administrative hierarchy of a given state agency. By measuring 
scope we aim to determine levels of politicization within and between 
the two countries (Kopecký et al. 2016). By “power of appointment” we 
denote the political actor or actors that have the real power here, regard-
less of the legal one. By studying the power of appointment we aim to 
determine the partisan or personalistic nature of patronage networks, as 
well as the ability of executive officeholders to make patronage appoint-
ments with autonomy from the ruling party or parties (Scherlis 2012).  
By motivates we understand the reason or reasons (they may have 
more than one) that patrons have when making a given appointment. 
Motives largely determine the roles played by appointees (Connaughton 
2015; Grindle 2012), and define the latter’s relations vis-à-vis the execu-
tive, the political system, and the public administration. Studies of pat-
ronage in Europe show that parties have sought to compensate for their 
lack of active militancy by becoming increasingly embedded in the state 
apparatus (Katz and Mair 1995). Following this logic, appointments are 
used to reward and maintain a network of political activists. While this 
may be the case, there is still the need to find out what roles – political 
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and technical – are played by appointees once installed. In line with this 
objective, and in order to better capture the roles that appointees play 
vis-à-vis the executive, political parties, and the public administration, we 
analytically distinguish between the following four motivations for these 
appointments:  
1) The provision of technical advice and expertise. While a neu-
tral and technically qualified civil service is regarded as an important 
asset for the practice of good governance, politicians increasingly seek 
the advice of experts aligned with their political views for policy design 
and implementation (Aberbach and Rockman 2005). We call this catego-
ry counselors. It includes experts who are organically linked to the ruling 
party, and combines both party political loyalty and technical capabilities 
– what the literature calls technopols (Domínguez 2010; Joignant 2011). It 
also denotes more independent experts aligned with the policies rather 
than the politics of the government – what the literature calls technocrats 
(Dargent 2014). Counselors are typically found at the higher level of the 
administrative hierarchy.  
2) The control of the public bureaucracy and other public sec-
tor resources, by acting as the “eyes, ears, and mouth” of their patrons 
(Connaughton 2015: 39). We call this category commissars. Appointees of 
this type are installed to supervise and control the public bureaucracy on 
behalf of the ruling party, party faction, or of individual officeholders. In 
the latter case, they tend to follow their political patrons through their 
different postings – as exemplified by the equipos attached to individual 
politicians in Mexico. In a different guise, they are also common within 
the United States federal administration.3  
3) Securing political support for policy initiatives. This category 
of appointments is related to the political rather than the technical di-
mension of the policy-making process. In order to secure political sup-
port for public-policy initiatives, governments need skilled political nego-
tiators to liaise with Congress and other key stakeholders. Appointees 
often play this role. We call these individuals political operators. Such op-
erators are particularly required in presidential systems, wherein the head 
of state has moderate powers and is obliged to permanently negotiate 
political support with other political actors – as is the case in the US 
(Halligan 2003). They tend to be party political cadres, and found at the 
high and middle levels of the public administration. 

3  See: <www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/white-house-installs-political-aide 
s-at-cabinet-agencies-to-be-trumps-eyes-and-ears/2017/03/19> (11 September 
2017). 
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4) To gather electoral support. This task is typically carried out by 
low-level public sector employees acting as brokers or ward bosses 
(known as punteros, cabos electorais, and caudillos de barrio in different Latin 
American countries) and by activists. Brokers mediate particularistic 
exchanges between the government and the recipients of public goods 
and services on behalf of the ruling party or individual politicians (Stokes 
et al. 2013). Activists, in turn, participate as political cliques in rallies and 
distribute electoral propaganda on behalf of the ruling party or their 
political patrons. They are typical of political systems that resort to mass 
clientelism as an electoral currency, particularly at the provincial and 
municipal levels. Table 1 presents our taxonomy of patronage appoint-
ments. 
7DEOH7D[RQRP\RI3DWURQDJH3UDFWLFHV
Motivations Roles 
Technical advice and expertise Counselors (technopols and technocrats) 
Control of the public bureaucracy Commissars 
Political support for policy initiatives Political operators 
Electoral support Brokers and activists 
 
We conceive our taxonomy as a tool that can be used to better under-
stand differences in patronage practices. The prevalence of certain types 
of appointment and the nature of patronage networks within a given 
administration are set to impact differently on respective governance and 
governability; they also yield key insights about the relations between 
party systems, executive officeholders, and the public administration.  
In the case studies that follow, we apply our taxonomy to the study 
of the politics of patronage practices in the central public administrations 
under the left-of-center governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) 
and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015) in Argentina and Taba-
ré Vazquez (2005–2010) and José Mujica (2010–2015) in Uruguay re-
spectively. 
 &DVH6WXGLHV$UJHQWLQDDQG8UXJXD\
The cases of Argentina and Uruguay are particularly well suited for a 
pilot study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America 
under John Stuart Mill’s method of difference (Lijphart 1977; Mill 1961). 
The cases combine strong contextual similarities regarding socioeconom-
ic and historical variables, and have important differences in the institu-
tional and agency factors that are assumed to explain variation in the 
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politics of patronage. This combination of similarities and differences is 
bound to minimize variance in certain variables while simultaneously 
making it more evident in others.  
Argentina and Uruguay have similar and relatively high levels of 
economic and human development (United Nations Development Pro-
gram 2016; World Bank 2016), which have been regarded as important 
variables in explaining the decline in the use of mass clientelism as an 
electoral resource in the two countries (Kopecký and Mair 2006; Stokes 
et al. 2013). Both share strong historical, economic, and cultural links, 
and have experienced similar cycles of authoritarianism and democratiza-
tion since the 1970s. The two countries were the earliest full democracies 
in Latin America (González 2012). Concerning the history of the public 
sector, in both countries democratization preceded the setting up of a 
professional bureaucracy – a sequence that has been associated with the 
politicization of the civil service (Shefter 1977). The two countries shared 
the same score (52 on a 1 to a 100 scale) in Zuvanic, Iacoviello, and 
Rodríguez Gustá’s (2010) index of the use of merit in bureaucratic bod-
ies. The score places them equal fourth in the region behind Brazil, 
Chile, and Costa Rica, and well above the Latin American average of 33 
in the ranking of public sector professionalization. These conditions 
make the central public administrations of these two relatively highly-
developed countries ideal loci for our research, because we expect to find 
here politicized but not mass clientelistic central administration bureau-
cracies.4 
By way of contrast the two countries exhibit significant variation in 
key institutional and agency factors, ones that have been related to the 
politics of patronage. Institutionally, Argentina has been characterized as 
a “delegative” and as a “hyper-presentialist” democracy (Castells 2012; 
Casullo 2015; Nino 1992; O’Donnell 1994; Rose-Ackerman and Desierto 
2011). These delineations refers to the combination of majoritarian poli-
tics, weak horizontal accountability, and the political centrality of the 
presidency. The Argentinean head of state enjoys strong legislative pow-
ers that allow them to rule by decree, have the budgetary initiative, and 
to use the legislative line-item veto (Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Payne 
2006; Negretto 2004). Concerning the party system, from the second half 
of the twentieth century until the November 2015 presidential election it 
was dominated by the Peronist party. The 2001–2002 financial crises hit 
particularly hard the non-Peronist parties in office at the time, reinforc-

4  In Argentina, however, mass clientelism is still common at the provincial level 
(Scherlis 2013). 
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ing the historical hegemony of the Peronist party that won three consec-
utive presidential elections between 2003 and 2011 (Casullo 2015; Torre 
2003).  
Institutionally, Uruguay is a liberal democracy (Freedom House 
2017) characterized by the strong rule of law and an effective system of 
checks and balances (World Bank 2016). The political matrix is charac-
terized by a highly institutionalized party system with strong program-
matic elements (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Par-
ties are internally organized into political factions, ones that are also 
highly institutionalized. Presidential powers in Uruguay are relatively 
weaker than in Argentina (Payne 2006).5 Politically, the power of the 
president is constrained by the need to negotiate with the ruling party 
and party factions as well as by a more powerful parliament. This makes 
Uruguay one of the few countries in the Latin American region that can 
be typified as a system of party government (Katz 1986; Rose 1969; Wil-
denmann 1986).  
Politically, Argentina has a long tradition of populism – to the ex-
tent that it has been labeled a populist democracy (Casullo 2015). The 
Peronist party has been historically regarded as one of the electorally 
most successful populist machines in the region (Levitsky and Roberts 
2011). Presidents belonging to the Peronist party have traditionally en-
joyed a high degree of discretionary freedom to allocate state resources, 
which they have used to consolidate their power over the ruling party 
and, via the state governors, over the clientelistic provincial political 
machines that provide crucial electoral support too (Scherlis 2013).  
The Peronist party administrations of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) 
and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2011, 2011–2015) were re-
garded as examples of the left-wing populist governments in Latin 
America’s populist–social-democratic left divide (González 2012; Horo-
witz 2012; Philip and Panizza 2011). The Kirchners’ own political group-
ing, the Frente para la Victoria (FPV, the Front for Victory – also known 
as Kirchnerismo), was formally part of the Peronist party. But relations 
between the two organizations were often strained, as the grouping be-
came effectively an autonomous political machine controlled by the 
Kirchners from within the executive.  
The Frente Amplio administrations that ruled Uruguay between 
2005 and 2015 were regarded as part of twenty-first-century Latin Amer-
ica’s “late social democracies” (Lanzaro 2014). The Frente Amplio is an 

5  Payne (2006) assigns Uruguayan presidents an index of 0.39 and Argentinean 
ones an index of 0.47, in his 0 to 1 scale of presidential powers – in which 0 is 
minimum power and 1 maximum.  
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alliance of left and left-of-center political groupings that, in line with the 
institutional features of Uruguay’s political parties, are formally constitut-
ed as autonomous political factions. The Frente Amplio’s access to gov-
ernment in 2005 represented an important change in Uruguay’s historical 
domination by the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties without, how-
ever, representing a rupture with the country’s liberal-democratic institu-
tions, strong welfare state, mixed economy, policy gradualism, and highly 
institutionalized party system (Lanzaro 2014; Panizza 2015). 
The large number of institutional and agency variables that are con-
sidered to influence patronage appointments make it difficult to account 
for differences in practices at high levels of generality, and moreover 
independently of the political context. Aware of the danger of generaliz-
ing from a paired comparison, this study assumes that differences in the 
politics of patronage in the two countries are the result of a number of 
politico-institutional and agency factors that find expression in two dif-
ferent forms of exercising governmental power. We expect that, in the 
period under study, in Argentina stronger presidential powers, a domi-
nant party, a weaker party system, and high levels of political polarization 
will result in greater levels of politicization of the public administration; 
that presidents and ministers will exercise their power of appointment 
with relatively strong degrees of autonomy from the ruling party; and, 
that control of the public administration and the electorally driven in-
termediation between the government and the recipients of public goods 
and services will be a significant motivation for the appointments.  
In Uruguay, we expect that a competitive party system, the consoci-
ational nature (Lijphart 1977) of the decision-making process, and lower 
levels of political polarization will result in a reduced scope of patronage, 
parties having significant influence in the process of appointments, se-
curing political support for the government being a significant motiva-
tion for the appointment, and, finally, the programmatic nature of the 
party system being reflected in the importance of technical advice and 
expertise. In terms of our taxonomy, we hence expect to find relatively 
more commissars, brokers, and activists in Argentina and more coun-
selors and political operators in Uruguay meanwhile.
 5HVHDUFK'HVLJQDQG0HWKRGRORJ\
Measuring patronage is no straightforward task, as the exercising of it 
comprises a combination of both formal and informal practices (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2006). An analysis of the formal rules – such as laws, de-
crees, and constitutional dispositions – that regulate public sector ap-
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pointments can give a broad idea of the official number of discretional 
such ones. Such a study, however, risks overlooking a significant number 
of appointments that are regulated by the informal rules that sidestep, 
bypass, distort, or simply outright violate established legal dispositions. 
As is often the case, and as Grindle puts it, “de facto practice trumps de 
jure theory” (2012: 145–146). In an effort to obtain a more compre-
hensive picture hereof, scholars have attempted to estimate the numbers 
of discretional appointments by using such proxies as increases in the 
number of public employees or in personnel-related spending. These 
indicators, however, are influenced by factors lying beyond the power to 
appoint discretionarily, and may thus not truly reflect patronage practices 
(Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012; Scherlis 2013). 
Informal practices are notoriously difficult to measure with accura-
cy, and borderline cases often require judgment calls being made. One 
accepted qualitative method for measuring the impact of informal insti-
tutions on public life is to survey the perceptions of experts (Peabody et 
al. 1990; Transparency International 2017). This method was used, for 
example, by Peter Evans and James Rauch (1999) to identify the features 
of Weberian bureaucracies in newly industrialized countries.  
Our research adopts and adapts the surveying of experts method 
used by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008) in their study of patron-
age appointments and more recently employed by Meyer-Sahling and 
Veem (2012) as well as by Kopecký et al. (2016) for the comparative 
study of patronage in 22 countries from five world regions. In order to 
elicit a more rounded picture of the two countries’ patronage practices, 
and in an effort to minimize cognitive and political bias, we drew our 
interviewees from a wide range of political and professional fields – ones 
comprising experts with a broad knowledge of the public administration 
and party systems of the two countries in question as well as key inform-
ants chosen for their inside knowledge of four selected areas of the cen-
tral public administration of each. Experts included scholars, specialized 
journalists, trade union leaders, parliamentarians, and public sector con-
sultants. Key informants included both active and retired career civil 
servants, trade unionists, current and former executive officeholders, and 
politically appointed public sector workers.  
We chose, as noted, four policy areas representative of the central 
public administration in both countries: the economy, social develop-
ment, foreign relations, and agriculture. These were chosen on the ex-
pectation, based on the literature on public bureaucracies, that they are 
representative of different patterns of bureaucratic professionalization 
(Peters 1988): more professional vis-à-vis the economy and foreign af-
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fairs, more technical regarding agriculture, and more politicized when it 
comes to social development. The administrative hierarchy in each area 
was divided into “high” (top managerial level), “middle” (lower manage-
rial and high administrative levels), and “low” (low administrative level; 
technical and service personnel) tiers, in accordance with each country’s 
administrative scale of public sector positions.  
The questionnaire was administered through semi-structured, face-
to-face interviews with 16 experts (9 in Argentina and 7 in Uruguay) and 
64 key informants (29 in Argentina and 35 in Uruguay), conducted be-
tween April 2014 and November 2016. The questionnaire, and a list of 
interviewees with their work profiles are attached as an Appendix. Inter-
viewees were asked to provide both quantitative estimates and qualitative 
accounts of patronage. As a way of appraising the scope of patronage 
appointments, while taking into account both formal and informal rules, 
we used the so-called index of party patronage (IPP) (Kopecký, Scherlis, 
and Spirova 2008; Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012; Kopecký et al. 
2016). This index uses survey results to measure the extent and depth of 
patronage appointments across institutions and levels of hierarchy. The 
IPP varies from 0 (no patronage appointments) to 1 (all appointments 
are patronage ones).  
We complemented the questionnaire and checked against the inter-
viewees’ views with a number of both primary and secondary sources. 
These included government documents, background interviews, freedom 
of information requests, press reports, international surveys, and aca-
demic studies. For changes in the total number of public employees, we 
relied on officially published figures. We surveyed legislation and other 
publically available sources to estimate the number of discretional ap-
pointments authorized by law. The following section now presents a 
summary of our main findings. 
 )LQGLQJV
 6FRSHDQG3ROLWLFL]DWLRQ
According to our survey the IPP of Argentina, at 0.77, was significantly 
higher than that of Uruguay, at 0.61. To place these figures into context, 
the IPPs of both Argentina and Uruguay were noticeably above those of 
Eastern Europe (0.42) and Southern Europe (0.45) but well below those 
of Guatemala (0.98) and Paraguay (0.97) – two Latin American countries 
notoriously characterized by mass patronage (Kopecký et al. 2016). To 
complement the IPP, we looked additionally at the ratio of nontenured 
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(mainly public sector workers on fixed-term contracts) to tenured posi-
tions. While this indicator must be used with caution because nonten-
ured employees can be appointed for a variety of reasons and many 
contracts tend to be converted into tenured positions eventually (Scherlis 
2013), the presence of a large number of nontenured public workers on 
fixed-term contracts may be a mechanism for setting up a parallel admin-
istration – and thus a proxy for politicization. In Argentina under the 
Kirchners, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of nontenured 
appointments – which went up from 20.3 percent to 57.3 percent in the 
years of their rule (Llano and Iacoviello 2015). In Uruguay, in contrast, 
there was a small decline from 8.8 percent to 6.2 percent herein during 
the administrations of the Frente Amplio (Oficina Nacional de Servicio 
Civil 2016). 
)LJXUH(YROXWLRQRI3HUPDQHQWDQG1RQSHUPDQHQW&LYLO6HUYDQWVLQWKH
&HQWUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLRQLQ$UJHQWLQD±DQG8UXJXD\
±

6RXUFH /ODQRDQG,DFRYLHOOR2ILFLQD1DFLRQDOGH6HUYLFLR&LYLO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Patronage appointments reached considerable depths within the admin-
istrative structure, particularly in Argentina.6 For this country, 89 percent 
of interviewees considered most appointments (ranging between 80 
percent and 100 percent) at the top level of the administrative structure 
(the one immediately below political positions, such as ministers) to be 
based on patronage, while in Uruguay 88 percent of interviewees also 
chose this particular range too. This finding was not especially surprising 
in the case of Uruguay, given that the law establishes the discretionary 
nature of appointments at this level. In Argentina, however, positions at 
this level are mandated by law to be filled through “competitive process-
es” (concursos de oposicion y méritos) among high civil servants; the winners 
should be appointed for a period of between five to seven years.  
According to our survey results, a significant proportion of middle-
level appointments in both of these countries were also based on patron-
age. Range estimates, however, varied significantly both within and be-
tween countries. In Argentina, 35.7 percent of respondents estimated 
that between 50 percent and 79 percent of appointments at this level 
were patronage ones – while a further 32 percent estimated the ap-
pointments at the lower range of between 10 percent to 49 percent here-
of. In Uruguay, 39.5 percent and 18.6 percent of interviewees opted for 
the higher and lower ratios respectively. Altogether, 67.7 percent of in-
terviewees in Argentina and 58.1 percent of those in Uruguay considered 
that there were at least some patronage appointments at the middle level 
of the administrative hierarchy. This finding goes against legal disposi-
tions in both countries prescribing that most, if not all, positions at this 
level must be filled by career civil servants in accordance with rules for 
promotions. A difference between the two countries was that while in 
Uruguay appointees at this level were usually coopted from within their 
ministry or agency and appointed to a higher managerial position on a 
temporary basis, in Argentina they tended to be prior outsiders – thus 
further disrupting the administrative structure.7  

6  The questionnaire provided a nominal list of the positions considered to be at 
the high and middle levels of the administrative structure in each country.  
7  In Uruguay, to get round the legal disposition ministers promote functionaries 
benefiting from their personal or political trust within their ministries in an act-
ing capacity – a widely used mechanism known as encargaturas. The use of this 
tool was mentioned by several experts in the semi-structured interviews. In Ar-
gentina, in contrast, ministries tend to bring “their own people” from outside. 
For corroborating evidence on Uruguay, see Filgueira et al. (2002); for Argenti-
na, see Scherlis (2009) and Ferraro (2006). 
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The survey also revealed differences between Argentina and Uru-
guay regarding the scope of patronage appointments at the lowest levels 
of the public administration. The central public administration in Uru-
guay was perceived as nearly free of patronage appointments by a large 
majority of interviewees (97.8 percent). In contrast, all interviewees in 
Argentina claimed that there were at least some patronage appointments 
at this level – although they differed on estimates of the phenomenon’s 
magnitude. Differences within countries in the estimates of patronage at 
both the middle and lower levels are at least partly explainable by varia-
tions in scope between the four areas of the public administration cov-
ered in the survey. For example, both in Argentina and Uruguay key 
informants within the Ministry of Social Development coincided in their 
view that most appointments at the middle level were patronage ones 
while informants from each’s Ministry of Foreign Relations perceived 
lower degrees of patronage at the same level.  
7DEOH6FRSHRI3DWURQDJHE\/HYHO
Level Scope Argentina (in %) Uruguay (in %) 
High All-Almost all (80%–100%) 89.3 88.1 
Many (50%–79%) 10.7 7.1 
Quite (10%–49%) 0 4.8 
A few (1%–9%) 0 0 
Middle All-Almost all (80%–100%) 28.6 18.6 
Many (50%–79%) 35.7 39.5 
Quite (10%–49%) 32.0 18.6 
A few (1%–9%) 3.6 14.0 
None  0.0 9.3 
Low All-Almost all (80%–100%) 7.1 0 
Many (50%–79%) 14.3 0 
Quite (10%–49%) 32.1 2.3 
A few (1%–9%) 46.4 34.9 
None  0.0 62.8 
 
All interviewees in Uruguay agreed that political and policy differences 
between the Frente Amplio administrations and previous governments 
did not lead to a significant overall increase in patronage appointments 
or to alternate patterns of politicization either. It must be noted, howev-
er, that the number of legally authorized discretional appointments (cargos 
de confianza) at both the national and departmental (provincial) level went 
up from 324 in 2005 (Ramos 2009: 354; Correa Freitas and Vázquez 
1998: 159) to 671 in 2015 (Oficina Nacional de Servicio Civil 2016: 29, 
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Table 11).8 While this increase is seemingly significant, only 159 of these 
positions were in the central administration – with the majority (440) of 
the cargos de confianza being appointments at the departmental (provincial) 
level. Moreover, these individuals amount to just about 0.2 percent of 
the total number of public employees. Regarding nondiscretional ap-
pointments, the administration of President Mujica centralized civil ser-
vice recruitment within the National Civil Service Bureau (Oficina 
Nacional de Servicio Civil, ONSC) so as to increase compliance with 
meritocratic processes.9 
 :KR$SSRLQWV"
The degree of consultation between the president, ministers, and parties 
when making patronage appointments is an important indicator of the 
powers of the head of state, as well as of the relations between the ruling 
party or parties and executive officeholders. Our research shows that 
while in some cases officeholders (presidents and ministers) exercised 
their powers of appointment autonomously, in others they did it in con-
sultation with other relevant actors. Figure 2 summarizes the aggregate 
results of respondents’ perceptions on the powers of appointment in 
Argentina and Uruguay respectively. 
)LJXUH([SHUWV¶3HUFHSWLRQRI3RZHURI$SSRLQWPHQWLQ


8  In Table 11, the cargos de confianza are codified as escalafón “Q.” 
9  “Uruguay Concursa.” Article 127, Law 18,7191 of 27 December 2010 and Exec-
utive Decree dated 27 February 2011, online: <www.uruguayconcursa.gub.uy/ 
uruguayconcursa/uruguay_concursa_normativa.htm> (22 August 2016). 
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Two main findings stand out from this part of the research:  
1) Presidents and ministers played a key role in the appointment 
process in both countries. The majority of our informants (48.5 percent 
in Argentina and 74 percent in Uruguay) agreed that ministers were the 
most relevant patrons within the ministries under their control. A signifi-
cantly larger number of informants in Argentina (45 percent) than in 
Uruguay (12 percent), though, considered it to be the president who held 
the main power of appointment.10 The claim that ministers had power of 
appointment did not mean, however, that they personally made discre-
tional ones in all areas and at all levels within their domains. Ministers 
often also delegated powers of appointment down the administrative 
ladder to under secretaries, agency directors, and program coordinators – 
who in many cases were political appointees themselves. 
2) In Argentina, over 70 percent of respondents claimed that presi-
dents and ministers made appointments with autonomy from the ruling 
party. Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
largely ignored the ruling Peronist party when making appointments, 
relying instead mostly on trusted former members of Néstor Kirchner’s 
state administration (1991–2002) in the province of Santa Cruz (Scherlis 
2012) while using patronage appointments to build up their own political 
grouping, the aforementioned FPV, from within the state.  
During the administrations of Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cris-
tina Fernández de Kirchner, there was an intensive process of top-down 
politicization (Van der Meer, Steen, and Wille 2007) intended to secure 
the presidency’s political control of the public administration – and par-
ticularly over strategic agencies. As noted by several key informants, this 
process was especially noticeable during the last two years of President 
Fernández de Kirchner’s second administration. For this purpose, the 
executive colonized key public sector agencies by making patronage 
appointments at levels traditionally staffed by professional bureaucrats.11 
For instance, in 2006, in a highly publicized and well-documented case 
(Jueguen and Bullrich 2009; Noriega 2012), the government of President 

10  The fact that the Kirchners exercised their power of appointment over the 
head of ministers was noted by several respondents, particularly in Interviews 
No. 5 and No. 12 (Appendix). For corroborating evidence for this, see also 
Scherlis (2012: 59). 
11  According to key informants, this was particularly evident in the Ministry of the 
Economy as well as in the international trade and economic areas of the Minis-
try of Foreign Relations too, in which outsiders were appointed to positions 
that had traditionally been held by professional staff (Interviews No. 9 and 
No. 14). 
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Néstor Kirchner removed over 20 professional staff from the National 
Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo, INDEC) 
and replaced them with political appointees – that in order to manipulate 
the official figures for inflation.  
The distinction between the personal and the partisan, and between 
public sector duties and political activism, was, however, not always clear 
cut in Argentina. For example, the appointment of militants from La 
Cámpora (a political grouping directly controlled by the Kirchners) was 
based on personal links that often went back to a common university 
background; in many cases, though, appointer and appointee also shared 
politico-ideological sympathies. Moreover, La Cámpora itself evolved 
away from being a loose network of militants into a more institutional-
ized political grouping, further blurring the distinction between personal 
and partisan loyalty. This grouping was originally set up in 2003 by Nés-
tor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s son, Máximo, as an 
organization of young political cadres at the service of his parents’ politi-
cal project (Rocca Rivarola 2013). Particularly in the last two years of her 
second administration President Fernández de Kirchner used her powers 
of appointment to build up La Cámpora as a personal political machine 
(Novaro, Bonvecchi, and Cherny (2015). Close political allies of the 
president followed the same logic. For example, Alicia Kirchner, sister of 
the late Néstor Kirchner and minister for social development during 
both his and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s administrations, set up 
the so-called Kolina organization of activists within her ministry as a 
personal political apparatus that came to be known as La Agrupación de 
Alicia (“Alicia’s Grouping”) (Vázquez 2014).  
In contrast to the FPV’s state-centered construction of its political 
organization, in Uruguay party factions were structured outside and in-
dependently of the public administration. However these factions were 
still key actors in the politics of patronage there. As a general rule, presi-
dents from all parties took into account the political weight of the ruling 
party’s highly institutionalized factions when making ministerial ap-
pointments or, in the case of coalition governments, of the parties and 
factions of the governmental coalition (Buquet, Chasquetti, and Car-
darello 2013). According to our survey, ministers enjoyed a high degree 
of autonomy from the president when making appointments within their 
ministries but in most cases they consulted their own party or party 
faction and appointed members from the latter. A study of discretional 
appointments below cabinet level during the 2005–2015 Frente Amplio 
administrations by Ramos, Casa, and Samudio (2017) demonstrates a 
high positive correlation between the relative electoral weight of the 
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party’s factions and the number of these made by each, suggesting that 
such appointments were part of the government’s coalition management 
toolkit.   
 0RWLYHVDQG5ROHV
Addressing the patrons’ motivations for making appointments is crucial 
for understanding the specific roles played by political appointees. Table 
3 summarizes the interviewees’ perceptions about the patrons’ main 
motives – and also of the subsequent roles performed by the appointees. 
In analyzing these results, it must be taken into account that patrons 
could have more than one motivation when making a particular ap-
pointment. 
7DEOH3HUFHSWLRQRIWKH,PSRUWDQFHRI6SHFLILF0RWLYDWLRQVDQG5ROHV
IRU$SSRLQWPHQWVE\/HYHORI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH+LHUDUFK\
Level Argentina Importance 
(in %) 
Uruguay Importance 
(in %) 
High Policy expertise 
(Counselors) 
92.6 Policy expertise 
(Counselors) 
79.5 
Control of bureau-
cracy (Commis-
sars) 
63.0 Operate political-
ly (political 
operators 
77.3 
Middle Policy expertise 
(Counselors) 
82.1 Policy expertise 
(Counselors) 
69.4 
Control of bureau-
cracy (Commis-
sars) 
70,4 Control of bu-
reaucracy 
(Commissars) 
61.1 
Low Reward of brokers 
and activists  
64.0 n/a -- 
 
According to 87 percent of interviewees in Argentina and 75 percent 
thereof in Uruguay the main motivation for appointments at the high 
and middle tiers of the public administration was the provision of tech-
nical advice and expertise for policy design and implementation, leading 
to the appointment of counselors. Technical expertise, however, was not 
the sole criterion for these appointments, as it was always combined with 
either personal or partisan trust. While in Uruguay there was a strong 
emphasis on the latter form, in Argentina there were no significant dif-
ferences between personal and partisan trust – which is in line with the 
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observation from interviewees that technical, personal, and partisan links 
were often superimposed in groupings such as La Cámpora.12  
A further significant difference in motivations is apparent from 
comparing the relative importance assigned to control over the bureau-
cracy as well as to the ability to operate politically. According to the sur-
vey figures, across all levels of the two countries’ central public admin-
istration there was more than a 10 percentage point difference in favor 
of Argentina in the importance assigned to control over the bureaucracy 
– reflected in the appointment of a higher number of commissars there. 
Some interviewees noted that the Kirchners’ administrations were par-
ticularly mistrustful of the loyalty and neutrality of the civil service. The 
response of one key informant, a politically appointed high civil servant 
in the Ministry of Finance, who belongs to the Cuerpo de Administra-
dores Gubernamentales (a senior public sector management category), 
encapsulated the government’s skepticism about the principle of a 
politically neutral civil service – namely, by arguing that it would be im-
possible to implement government policies by trusting civil servants 
from previous administrations, because of their differing views about the 
ideal working of the economy.13 The informant’s remarks must be inter-
preted within the context of a government that sought to break with the 
neoliberal consensus that had dominated Argentinean politics during the 
preceding two decades (Wylde 2016). Rightly or wrongly, office-holding 
politicians saw career civil servants as part of the old consensus – which 
could only be broken by the appointment of trusted commissars to con-
trol the public bureaucracy. 
7DEOH,QIRUPDQWV¶3HUFHSWLRQVRI0RWLYDWLRQVIRU$SSRLQWPHQWV&RQWURO
DQG2SHUDWH3ROLWLFDOO\2QO\$OO/HYHOVLQ
 Control of Bureaucracy Operate Politically 
Argentina 67.27 42.86 
Uruguay 56.52 66.25 
 
Moreover, technical expertise and political activism were not regarded as 
separate qualities; rather, they complemented each other in the pursuit of 
an alternative model of development and the consolidation of the elec-
toral hegemony of the FPV. As one of our interviewees, an agronomist 
working in the Ministry of Agroindustry, put it:  

12  Interviews Nos. 2, 3, 5, 12, and 15. See also, Scherlis (2012). 
13  Interview No. 9 (a politically appointed high civil servant in the Ministry of the 
Economy). 
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People think that because we are militants of La Cámpora we are 
here to bang the drums [a practice associated with the Peronist 
party’s and trade unions’ political rallies] and eat choripans [barbe-
cue pork sausages, a popular street food] but in fact many of us 
belong to the intellectual middle class.14  
In an example of the blurring of the distinction between technical exper-
tise and political militancy, in 2011 a group of economists within the 
Ministry of the Economy created an organization called La GraN MaKro 
– with the core purpose thereof being to publicly defend the govern-
ment’s economic policies as a technically sound alternative to neoliberal 
orthodoxy (Vázquez 2014: 73).  
In Uruguay, in contrast, the more gradualist nature of political and 
economic change and the consociational characteristics of its political 
system resulted in the highest priority being assigned to the appointment 
of political operators. This was in order to articulate political support for 
the government’s policies within the ruling party and party factions: 
some 69 percent of our interviewees in Uruguay considered the ability to 
operate politically as a relevant selection criterion at the top level of the 
public administration, while a further 43 percent regarded it as relevant at 
the middle level. The corresponding figures for Argentina were 42.9 
percent and 10.7 percent respectively meanwhile.  
Furthermore it is important to note that in Uruguay counselors of-
ten doubled up as political operators too, as many of the former were 
also party members with considerable political experience who used their 
political know-how to generate support for government policies. One of 
our key informants, a high-ranking policymaker in the Ministry of the 
Economy during the first Vázquez administration, highlighted his role as 
a political operator. He noted that he used to spend about half of his 
time negotiating political support for the ministry’s policies with leaders 
of his own party within the executive, parliament, and within the Frente 
Amplio’s own executive too.15 
At the lower tier of the public administration, the appointment of 
brokers to mediate between the government and the recipients of public 
goods and services was perceived by 64 percent of those interviewees 
detecting patronage at this level in Argentina as being the primary moti-
vation for the appointments. Other studies have shown that the wider 
category of “political activists” was also relevant here (Zarazaga 2014; 

14  Interview No. 36 (an appointee in charge of parliamentary affairs in the Minis-
try of Agroindustry). 
15  Interview No. 40 (Appendix) (a high political appointee in the Ministry of the 
Economy). 
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Faur 2011).16 The importance of such activism at this level is reflected in 
comments from one of our key informants, an employee in the Ministry 
of Agroindustry:  
I recently joined the ministry together with a large group of Pe-
ronist militants to work in the administration while simultaneously 
campaigning for the government. Recently, my comrades called 
me to attention because lately I have become too involved with 
my work within the ministry to the neglect of political militancy.17  
In Uruguay, the occurrence of only low numbers of discretional ap-
pointments at this level unfortunately thus does not allow us to draw any 
firm conclusions about motivations herein. 
 &RQFOXVLRQ
Our comparative study bridges the literature on public administration 
and on politics, two strands of scholarly research that do not always 
converse with each other. It makes four specific contributions to the 
study of the politics of patronage in Latin America: Conceptually, it 
adopts Kopecký et al.’s (2006) distinction between clientelistic and other 
modalities of patronage appointment and widens these authors’ classifi-
cation of patrons’ motivations for making appointments – that in order 
to better reflect the variety of roles played by appointees vis-à-vis the 
executive, the ruling party, and the public administration. Analytically, it 
sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments that can be used for 
the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies 
the taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina 
and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, 
with the customary caveats about generalizing from a paired comparison, 
it contributes to theory-building on the politics of patronage in Latin 
America by relating differences in such practices to institutional and 
political factors within the two respective countries under study here.  
 
Five main findings emerge from our research: 
1) The scope of patronage largely confirms the picture of two polit-
icized central administrations that were not, however, characterized by 
traditional forms of mass clientelism. With this common baseline, differ-

16  See: <www.lanacion.com.ar/1869917-echaron-del-ministerio-de-agroindustria-
a-330-contratados> (14 November 2018). 
17  Interview No. 34 (see Appendix) (a low-rank civil servant in the Ministry of 
Agroindustry). 
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ences in the respective IPPs as well as in the ratios of nontenured to 
tenured public sector workers are evidence that the central public admin-
istration was more politicized in Argentina than in Uruguay.  
2) Politicization not only run deeper in Argentina but it also worked 
different in the two countries more broadly. In Argentina, patronage was 
centrally controlled by the presidency in strategic areas and by ministers 
in other ones. As a general rule, there was little consultation with the 
ruling Peronist party when making appointments.  
Particularly during the administration of President Fernández de 
Kirchner, patronage appointments were used to build up La Cámpora as 
a personal political machine at her own service, autonomous from the 
Peronist party and even the FPV. Through the appointment of La 
Cámpora cadres to different areas of the public administration, President 
Fernández de Kirchner reinforced her control over a public sector bu-
reaucracy that was deeply mistrusted so as to satisfactorily implement the 
foundational project of her government. Last but not least, there was 
also a significant blurring of the divide between public sector service and 
political activism in these years.  
In Uruguay, in contrast, patronage was largely devolved to the 
Frente Amplio’s factions with little central interference from the presi-
dency. As a general rule, ministers appointed persons that enjoyed their 
personal trust but ultimately these decisions were taken in consultation 
with their own faction. The more horizontal nature of patronage ap-
pointments in Uruguay suggests that these were used as tools of coalition 
management by the presidency, and as mechanisms to consolidate the 
influence of their factions by ministers meanwhile.  
3) An analysis of motivations in terms of our taxonomy shows that, 
contrary to our expectations, there were no significant differences be-
tween the two countries in the importance assigned to the appointment 
of counselors. This was an unexpected finding concerning Argentina, 
given the emphasis in the literature on the Peronist party’s lack of firm 
ideological foundations and the importance assigned by the latter to 
corporatism and clientelism as electoral mechanisms. The finding is, 
however, in line with the argument that programmatic and clientelistic 
electoral appeals can certainly coexist in a political system, often operat-
ing at different geographical sites and political levels (Luna 2014). The 
importance of counselors in Argentina can also be explained by the 
Kirchners’ determination to make a clean break with the neoliberal poli-
cies of the previous administrations (Wylde 2016), as well as their lack of 
trust in the neutrality of a public administration that they suspected to be 
too close politically and ideologically to previous governments.  
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In contrast, and in line with our expectations, we found that rela-
tively more commissars were appointed in Argentina, while more politi-
cal operators were in Uruguay. If we take these findings together with 
the ones about variations in scope as well as in the real power of ap-
pointment, a clear picture emerges about two different political systems, 
two different political projects, and, ultimately, two different modes of 
exercising governmental power.  
Institutionally, differences in patronage practices can be attributed 
to Argentina being a political matrix with a strong presidency and a 
weakly institutionalized party system. In this the Peronists were the dom-
inant political force during the period under study, while the FPV 
emerged as a semiautonomous, personalistic faction within the Peronist 
party – one, moreover, directly controlled by the president. In contrast, 
Uruguay is a typical case of party government (Rose 1969) – a system in 
which political parties have a strong institutional presence and deep 
social roots. Ruling parties never offer a blank check to the president, 
who is obliged to permanently negotiate policy support with his own 
ministers (usually factions’ leaders) and with the party’s parliamentary 
factions too.  
4) Within this context, agents developed their own strategies regard-
ing the politics of patronage. In the case of Argentina, Kirchnerismo exac-
erbated the top-down politicization of the public administration and the 
in-built personalistic bias of patronage – particularly during President 
Fernández de Kirchner’s second administration. Meyer-Sahling and Veen 
(2012) claim that problems of political control over the bureaucracy are 
more severe in political contexts characterized by regular wholesale al-
ternations between ideological blocks of parties in government. Drawing 
on this claim, it could be argued that the hyperpoliticized, rupturist na-
ture of the Kirchnerismo (Laclau 2006; Panizza 2015) brand of left-wing 
populism made the political control of the bureaucracy a high priority for 
the Argentine government – as expressed in the importance that it as-
signed to the appointment of political commissars. In contrast, in the 
Uruguayan case, the Frente Amplio – as a moderate left-of-center politi-
cal force – largely maintained the traditional patterns of bargaining and 
negotiating that have long been characteristic of the politics of appoint-
ment in Uruguay. Hence, the relatively larger number of political opera-
tors there. 
5) Last but not least, our findings are relevant for understanding the 
relations between politics and the public administration. The relatively 
large number of counselors in both countries shows that the two gov-
ernments have important programmatic components – and that securing 
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policy responsiveness was a high priority.18 We must stress, however, 
that the fact that appointees had technical expertise does not mean that 
they were the best-qualified persons for their respective jobs, particularly 
given that such know-how was combined also with personal or partisan 
trust. The abundance of commissars and political operators at the middle 
level is also consistent with the respective administrations’ prioritization 
of such policy responsiveness. Taken together, counselors, commissars, 
and political operators almost completely monopolized policy design and 
implementation. While this did secure policy responsiveness, it neverthe-
less still raises the question of whether this institutional design is ulti-
mately the best one to ensure the quality of public policies. This, howev-
er, is a baton for further research to now take up. 
5HIHUHQFHV
Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman (2005), Civil Servants and Poli-
cymakers: Neutral or Responsive Competence?, in: Governance, 7, 4, 
461–469. 
Ames, Barry (1977), The Politics of Public Spending in Latin America, 
in: American Journal of Political Science, 21, 1, 149–176. 
Askim, Jostein, Rune Karlsen, and Kristoffer Kolltveit (2017), Political 
Appointees in Executive Government: Exploring and Explaining 
Roles Using a LargeǦN Survey in Norway, in: Public Administration, 
95, 2, 342–358. 
Auyero, Javier (2000), The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethno-
graphic Account, in: Latin American Research Review, 35, 3, 55–81. 
Bersch, Katherine, Sergio Praça, and Matthew Taylor (2017), State Ca-
pacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian 
State, in: Governance, 30, 1, 105–124. 
Buquet, Daniel, Daniel Chasquetti, and Antonio Cardarello (2013), La 
designación de gabinetes en Uruguay: estrategia legislativa, jerarquía 
de los ministerios y afiliación partidaria de los ministros, in: América 
Latina Hoy, 64, 15–40. 
Castells, Alberto (2012), La Institución Presidencial en el Sistema 
Político Argentino: Una plataforma de investigación, in: Revista 
Electrónica del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales Ambrosio L. 
Gioja, VI, 9, 30–60. 

18  In the case of Argentina this may be surprising for those who equate populism 
with clientelism and a lack of ideological principles. However, scholars of 
populism have shown that it is different from clientelism – and that populist 
parties can indeed have strong politico-ideological components to them. 
  The Politics of Patronage Appointments 85 

Casullo, María Esperanza (2015), Argentina: del bipartidismo a la demo-
cracia peronista, in: Nueva Sociedad, 257, 16–28. 
Chalmers, Douglas (1977), The Politicized State in Latin America, in: 
James M. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism, Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 23–45. 
Chubb, Judith (1982), Patronage, Power and Poverty: A Tale of Two Cities, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Connaughton, Bernadette (2015), Navigating the Borderlines of Politics 
and Administration: Reflections on the Role of Ministerial Advisers, 
in: International Journal of Public Administration, 38, 1, 37–45. 
Correa Freitas and Vázquez, Cristina (1998), Manual de Derecho de la 
Función Pública Uruguaya, Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Univer-
sitaria. 
Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern (2001), Latin America’s Reactive As-
semblies and Proactive Presidents, in: Comparative Politics, 171–189. 
Dargent, Eduardo (2014), Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Domínguez, Jorge (2010), Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin 
America in the 1990s, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press. 
Evans, Peter, and James Rauch (1999), Bureaucracy and Growth: A 
Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Struc-
tures on Economic Growth, in: American Sociological Review, 64, 5, 
748–765. 
Faur, Eleonor (2011), A Widening Gap? The Political and Social Organi-
zation of Childcare in Argentina, in: Development and Change, 42, 4, 
967–994. 
Filgueira, Fernando, Blanca Heredia, Pedro Narbondo, and Conrado 
Ramos (2002), La economía política de la reforma del servicio civil en 
Uruguay: los años 90, Inter-American Development Bank. 
Freedom House (2017), Freedom in the World 2017, online: <https://free 
domhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017> (6 
April 2018). 
Garcia Lopez, Felix (ed.) (2015), Cargos de Confiança Presidencialismo de 
Coalizão Brasileiro, Brasilia: IPEA. 
Geddes, Barbara (1994), Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin 
America, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
González, Francisco (2012) Creative Destruction? Economic Crises and Democ-
racy in Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Gordin, Jorge (2002), The Political and Partisan Determinants of Pat-
ronage in Latin America 1960–1994: A Comparative Perspective, in: 
European Journal of Political Research, 41, 4, 513–549. 
  86 F. Panizza, C. R. Ramos Larraburu, and G. Scherlis 

Grindle, Merilee S. (2012), Jobs for the Boys. Patronage and the State in Com-
parative Perspective, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hagopian, Frances, Carlos Gervasoni and Juan Andres Moraes (2009), 
From Patronage to Program: The Emergence of Party-Oriented 
Legislators in Brazil, in: Comparative Political Studies, 42, 3, 360–391. 
Halligan, John (2003), Leadership and the Senior Service from a Com-
parative Perspective, in: Handbook of Public Administration, London: 
Sage, 98–108. 
Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky (2006), Informal Institutions and 
Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore: John Hopkins Uni-
versity Press. 
Hilgers, Tina (ed.) (2012), Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Horowitz, Joel (2012), Populism and its Legacies in Argentina, in: Mi-
chael Connfif (ed.), Populism in Latin America, (Second Edition), Tus-
caloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 23–47.  
Johnston, Michael (1979), Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A 
Case Study of the Uses of Patronage, in: American Political Science Re-
view, 73, 385–398.  
Joignant, Alfredo (2011), Tecnócratas, technopols y dirigentes de 
partido: tipos de agentes y especies de capital en las élites guber-
namentales de la Concertación (1990–2010), in: Alfredo Joignant 
and Pedro Güell (eds), Tables, tecnócratas y mandarines: Elementos de 
sociología de las élites en Chile (1990–2010), Santiago de Chile: Edi-
ciones Universidad Diego Portales, 40–76. 
Jueguen, Francisco, and Lucrecia Bullrich (2009), INDEC: Una Destruc-
ción con el Sello de los Kirchner, Buenos Aires: EDHASA. 
Katz, Richard (1986), Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception, in: 
Francis Castles and Rudolf Wildenmann (eds), Visions and Realities of 
Party Government, Berlin: de Gruyter, 31–71. 
Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair (1995), Changing Models of Party Organi-
zation and Party Democracy the Emergence of the Cartel Party, in: 
Party Politics, 1, 1, 5–28. 
Key, Valdimer (1964), Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, New York: 
Crowell. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, 
and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2010), Latin American Party Systems, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
  
  The Politics of Patronage Appointments 87 

Kopecký, Petr, and Peter Mair (2006), Political Parties and Patronage in 
Contemporary Democracies: An Introduction, Workshop on Political Par-
ties and Patronage, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia 
(25–30 April). 
Kopecký, Petr, Peter Mair, and María Spirova (2012), Party Patronage and 
Party Government in European Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kopecký, Petr, Gerardo Scherlis, and Maria Spirova (2008), Conceptualiz-
ing and Measuring Party Patronage, Leiden University: Committee on 
Concepts and Methods Working Paper, Series 25. 
Kopecký, Petr, Jan Meyer-Sahling, Francisco Panizza, Gerardo Scherlis, 
Christian Schuster and María Spirova (2016), Party Patronage in 
Contemporary Democracies: Results from an Expert Survey in 
Twenty Two Countries from Five Regions, in: European Journal of Po-
litical Research, 55, 416–431. 
Kristinsson, Gunnar (2016), Specialists, Spinners and Networkers: Politi-
cal Appointees in Iceland, in: Acta Politica, 51, 4, 413–432. 
Laclau, Ernesto (2006), La Deriva Populista y la Centroizquierda Latino 
americana, in: Nueva Sociedad, 205, 56–61. 
Lanzaro, Jorge (2014), Uruguay’s Social Democratic Experiment, in: 
Current History, 113, 760, 76–81. 
Lazar, Sian (2004), Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Lo-
cal Elections in El Alto, Bolivia, in: Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
23, 2, Oxford, 228–243. 
Lémarchand, Rene (1981), Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, 
Process, and Optic, in: Shmuel Eisenstadt and Rene Lémarchand 
(eds), Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development, Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage, 7–32. 
Levitsky, Steven (2003), Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: 
Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts (2011), Latin America’s “Left 
Turn”. A Framework for Analysis, in: Steven Levitsky and Kenneth 
Roberts (eds), The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1–28. 
Lijphart, Arend (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explora-
tion, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Llano, Mercedes, and Mercedes Iacoviello (2015), Confianza mata mérito: el 
impacto de la concentración de poder presidencial en la gestión de recursos huma 
s en el Estado argentino, XII National Congress of Political Science, 
Argentinean Society of Political Analysis, Mendoza (12–15 August). 
  88 F. Panizza, C. R. Ramos Larraburu, and G. Scherlis 

LSE GV314 Group (2012), New Life at the Top: Special Advisers in 
British Government, in: Parliamentary Affairs, 65, 4, 715–732. 
Luna, Juan Pablo (2014), Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in 
Unequal Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully (1995), Introduction: Party Sys-
tems in Latin America, in: Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully 
(eds), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1–35. 
Meyer-Sahling, Jan, and Tim Veen (2012), Governing the Post-Com-
munist State: Government Alternation and Senior Civil Service Po-
liticization in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Eastern European Poli-
tics, 28, 1, 4–22. 
Mill, John Stuart (1961) (1843), A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: 
Being a Connective View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Sci-
entific Investigation, London: Longman. 
Müller, Wolfgang (2006), Party Patronage and Party Colonization of the 
State, in: Richard Katz and William Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party 
Politics, London: Sage, 189–195. 
Negretto, Gabriel (2004. Government Capacities and Policy Making by 
Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina, in: 
Comparative Political Studies, 37, 5, 531–562. 
Nino, Carlos (1992), El hiperpresidencialismo argentino y las concep-
ciones de la democracia, in: Carlos Nino and Roberto Gargarella 
(eds), El presidencialismo puesto a prueba, Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, 37–77. 
Noriega, Gustavo (2012), INDEC: Historia Íntima de una Estafa, Buenos 
Aires: Sudamericana. 
Novaro, Marcos, Alejandro Bonvecchi, and Nicolás Cherny (2015), Los 
límites de la untad. Los gobiernos de Duhalde, Néstory y Cristina Kirchner, 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Ariel. 
Oficina Nacional de Servicio Civil / Observatorio de la Gestión Humana 
edel Estado (2016), Vínculos Laborales con el Estado 2015, online: 
<www.onsc.gub.uy/onsc1/images/stories/Observatorio/2015/Inf
VínculosYAltasYBajas2015.pdf> (22 August 2016). 
O’Donnell, Guillermo (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: Journal of De-
mocracy, 5, 1, 55–69. 
Oliveros, Virginia (2016), Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and 
the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina, in: Com-
parative Politics, 48, 3, 373–391. 
  
  The Politics of Patronage Appointments 89 

Panizza, Francisco (2015), Populism, Socialdemocracy and the Tale of 
the “Two Lefts” in Latin America, in: Anthony Spanakos and Fran-
cisco Panizza (eds), Conceptualising Comparative Politics, London: 
Routledge, 192–214. 
Payne, Mark (2006), El equilibrio de poder entre el Ejecutivo y el 
Legislativo: Papel de la Constitución y los partidos políticos, in: 
Fernando Carrillo-Florez (ed.), La Política Importa. Democracia y desar-
rollo en América Latina, Washington, D.C.: IADB-IDEA, 91–128. 
Peabody, Robert, Susan Hammond, Jean Torcom, Lynne Brown, Car-
olyn Thompson, and Robin Kolodny (1990), Interviewing Political 
Elites, in: Political Science & Politics, 23, 3, 451–455. 
Peters, Guy (1988), Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems of Theory and 
Method, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 
Philip, George (2003), Democracy in Latin America, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Phillip, George, and Francisco Panizza (2011), The Triumph of Politics: The 
Return of the Left in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, Cambridge: Polity 
Books. 
Piattoni, Simons (2001), Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ramos, Conrado (2009), Radiografía del Cambio de Paradigma En La Admi-
nistración Pública, Montevideo: Instituto de Ciencia Política. 
Ramos, Conrado, Mauro Casa, and Tamara Samudio (2017), Función y 
roles del patronazgo partidario en América Latina: Las designaciones políticas 
del Frente Amplio en Uruguay (2005-2015), unpublished paper: Institu-
to de Ciencia Política, Universidad de la República, Montevideo. 
Rocca Rivarola, Dolores (2013), Relaciones y definiciones de pertenencia 
en los conjuntos o bases de sustentación activa de Lula (2002-2006) 
y Kirchner (2003-2007). Principales argumentos, in: Revista Temas y 
Debates, 26, 17, 39–75. 
Roniger, Louis (1994), The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the 
Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World, in: 
Louis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata (eds), Democracy, Clientelism, 
and Civil Society, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1–18.  
Rose, Richard (1969), The Variability of Party Government: A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Critique, in: Political Studies, XVII, 4, 413–445. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Diane A. Desierto (2011), Hyper-president-
ialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Ar-
gentina and Philippines, in: Berkeley Journal of International Law, 29, 1, 
246–333.  
Scherlis, Gerardo (2013), The Contours of Party Patronage in Argentina, 
in: Latin American Research Review, 48, 3, 63–84. 
  90 F. Panizza, C. R. Ramos Larraburu, and G. Scherlis 

Scherlis, Gerardo (2012), Designaciones y Organización Partidaria: El 
partido de redes gubernamentales en el peronismo Kirchnerista, in: 
América Latina Hoy, 62, 47–77. 
Shefter, Martin (1977), Patronage and Its Opponents: A Theory and Some Eu-
ropean Cases, Western Societies Program, N° 8, Center for Interna-
tional Studies, Cornell University. 
Spiller, Pablo, Ernesto Stein, Maria Tommasi, and Carlos Scartascini 
(2008), Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, 
Washington, D.C.: IADB. 
Stokes, Susan (2005), Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Ma-
chine Politics with Evidence from Argentina, in: American Political 
Science Review, 99, 3, 315–325. 
Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazare, and Valeria Brusco 
(2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Lucy (2004), Clientship and Citizenship in Latin America, in: 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23, 2, 213–227. 
Torre, Juan Carlos (2003), Los Huérfanos de la Política de Partidos. 
Sobre los alcances y la naturaleza de la crisis de representación 
partidaria, in: Desarrollo Económico, 42, 647–665. 
Transparency International (2017), Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, 
online: <www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_percepti 
ons_index_2017> (26 April 2018). 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2016), Human Develop-
ment Report 2016, online: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ 
2016_human_development_report.pdf> (1 May 2017). 
Van der Meer, Frits, Trui Steen and Anchrit Wille (2007), Western Eu-
ropean Civil Service Systems: A Comparative Analysis, in: Jos Raad-
schelders, Teo Toonen, and Frits Van der Meer (eds), The Civil Ser-
vice in the 21st Century, New York: Palgrave, 34–49. 
Vázquez, Melina (2014), Bringing Militancy to Management, in: Centro de 
Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico, XLI, 74, 67–97. 
Wildenmann, Rudolf (1986), The Problematic of Party Government, in: 
Francis G. Castles and Rudolf Wildenman (eds), The Future of Party 
Government, 1, Visions and Realities of Party Government, Berlin and New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1–30. 
World Bank (2016), World Development Indicators 2016, online: <http://da 
ta.worldbank.org/products/wdi> (22 August 2016). 
Wylde, Cristopher (2016) Post-neoliberal Developmental Regimes in 
Latin America: Argentina under Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, in: 
New Political Economy, 21, 3, 322–341. 
  The Politics of Patronage Appointments 91 

Zarazaga, Rodrigo (2014), Brokers beyond Clientelism: A New Perspec-
tive through the Argentine Case, in: Latin American Politics and Society, 
56, 3, 23–45. 
Zuvanic, Laura, Mercedes Iacoviello, and Ana Laura Rodríguez Gustá 
(2010), The Weakest Link: The Bureaucracy and Civil Service Sys-
tems in Latin America, in: Carlos Scartascini, Ernesto Stein, and 
Maria Tomassi (eds), How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Ac-
tors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking, Washington, D.C.: 
IADB, 147–176. 

  
  92 F. Panizza, C. R. Ramos Larraburu, and G. Scherlis 

Descifrando el Patronazgo: La Política de los Nombramientos de 
Patronazgo en las Administraciones Centrales de Argentina y 
Uruguay 
Resumen: Este articulo hace las siguientes contribuciones al estudio de 
la política de los nombramientos de patronazgo en América Latina: En 
lo conceptual adopta la distinción empleada por Kopecký, Scherlis, and 
Spirova’s (2008) entre formas clientelares y no clientelares de políticas de 
patronazgo, como un lente para el estudio específico de prácticas de 
patronazgo en regímenes presidencialistas en América Latina. En lo 
analítico, construye una nueva taxonomía de nombramientos de patro-
nazgo basada en los roles que los nombrados cumplen en relación al 
executivo, el partido gobernante y la administración pública, la cual pue-
de ser usada para el estudio comparado de la política del patronazgo. En 
lo empírico, aplica la taxonomía a un estudio piloto de la política del 
patronazgo en Argentina y Uruguay bajo dos administraciones de centro-
izquierda. En lo teórico, contribuye a la elaboración de teoría al relacio-
nar los hallazgos de investigación a diferencias en los sistemas de parti-
dos y en los poderes presidenciales en los dos países objeto de estudio, 
así como factores de agencia asociados a los proyectos políticos de los 
respectivos gobiernos. El articulo concluye que diferencias en las prácti-
cas de patronazgo son una manifestación de dos formas diferentes de 
ejercicio del poder gubernamental: una de tipo híper-presidencialista, 
populista en Argentina y otra de tipo partido-céntrica, social democrá-
tica, en Uruguay. 
Palabras clave: Argentina, Uruguay, nombramientos de patronazgo, 
alcances, poder de nombrar, motivaciones, roles 
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INTERVIEW N° 21 MBA in International Economic Affairs. Academic at the 
Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
INTERVIEW N° 22 Political Scientist. Public servant. Advisor at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.  
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INTERVIEW N° 23 Lawyer and serving diplomant, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. 
INTERVIEW N° 24 Political scientist specialised in international affairs.  
INTERVIEW N° 25 Public servant at the Ministry of Social Development. 
INTERVIEW N° 26 PhD in Political Science. High-ranked official at the 
Ministry of Social Development. 
INTERVIEW N° 27 Political appointee high-ranked official at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
INTERVIEW N° 28 Economist at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
INTERVIEW N° 29 Political scientist. Former Chief of Cabinet. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
INTERVIEW N° 30 Consultant in international relations, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
INTERVIEW N° 31 MBA in Economics. Director of Financial Products and 
Services at the Ministry of Economy. 
INTERVIEW N° 32 Economist. National Director of Public Investment at the 
Ministry of Economy. 
INTERVIEW N° 33 Economist. Director of Pre-Investment at the Ministry of 
Economy. 
INTERVIEW N° 34 Public servant at the Ministry of Agroindustry 
INTERVIEW N° 35 Politically appointee in charge of parliamentarian affairs 
at the Ministry of Agroindustry 
INTERVIEW N° 36 Biochemist. Ministerial advisor at the Ministry of Agroin-
dustry. 
INTERVIEW N° 37 Sociologist. Former Director of Provincial Agricultural 
Services at the Ministry of Agroindustry 
INTERVIEW N° 38 Journalist at the newspaper ‘Clarín’ 

Uruguay  
INTERVIEW N° 1 Public servant. Economist. Middle-level official at Na-
tional General Accountancy of MEF. 
INTERVIEW N° 2 Public servant. Tax Administration Department of MEF 
Workers’ Union President 
INTERVIEW N° 3 Lawyer. Politically appointed General Secretary of 
MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 4 Public servant. Economist. Politically appointee General 
Director of Administration at MRREE. 
INTERVIEW N° 5 Doctor in Social Sciences. Politically appointee MRREE’s 
Consular Affairs General Director. 
INTERVIEW N° 6 MBA in Political Science and Administration. Politically 
appointee Macro Social Policy Unit Director at MIDES. 
INTERVIEW N° 7 Public servant. National Customs Department of MEF 
Workers’ Union General Secretary. 
INTERVIEW N° 8 Lawyer. Politically appointed Ambassador in Italy 
(MREE). 
INTERVIEW N° 9 Lawyer. Serving Diplomat (MRREE). 
INTERVIEW N° 10 Public servant. Lawyer. National General Accountancy of 
MEF Workers’ Union General Secretary. 
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INTERVIEW N° 11 Retired public servant. Agricultural Engineer. Former 
technical advisor at Office of Agricultural Policy of 
MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 12 Senator. Former Minister and Deputy Minister of MGAP 
INTERVIEW N° 13 Accountant. Politically appointee National Customs 
Department Director at MEF. 
INTERVIEW N° 14 Economist. Politician. Former Minister of Economy and 
Finance (MEF). 
INTERVIEW N° 15 Political Scientist. Technician at MIDES. 
INTERVIEW N° 16 Agricultural Engineer. Economist. Politically appointed 
Ambassador at MERCOSUR and ALADI (MRREE) 
INTERVIEW N° 17 Public servant. Agricultural Engineer. Technical advisor 
at Office of Agricultural Policy of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 17 Serving Diplomat. Former General Secretary of MRREE. 
INTERVIEW N° 19 Public servant. Veterinary surgeon. Middle-level official at 
Cattle Raising Department of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 20 Public servant. Veterinary surgeon. Middle-level official at 
Cattle Raising Department of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 21 Public servant. Veterinary surgeon. Middle-level official at 
Cattle Raising Department of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 22 Anthropologist. Politically appointed Bordering Depart-
ment Deputy Director at MRREE. 
INTERVIEW N° 23 Serving Diplomat (MRREE). 
INTERVIEW N° 24 Agricultural Engineer. Former Director at Office of 
Agricultural Policy of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 25 Social Assistant. A former middle-level official at Social 
Development Department of MIDES. 
INTERVIEW N° 26 Sociologist. Politician. Politically appointed Family, Ado-
lescence and Childhood Institute Director (MIDES). 
INTERVIEW N° 27 Politician. Politically appointed as Ambassador 
(MRREE). 
INTERVIEW N° 28 Economist. Politically appointee National General Ac-
countancy Director (MEF). 
INTERVIEW N° 29 Psychologist. A former middle-level official at Family, 
Adolescence and Childhood Institute and Territory Man-
agement National Department (MIDES). 
INTERVIEW N° 30 Politically appointee advisor at Territory Management 
National Department (MIDES). 
INTERVIEW N° 31 Public servant. Agricultural Engineer. Technical advisor 
at Office of Agricultural Policy of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 32 President of Uruguay’s Central Bank. Former Ministry 
and Deputy Ministry of MEF 
INTERVIEW N° 33 Public servant. Accountant. Technical advisor at General 
Secretary of MEF. 
INTERVIEW N° 34 Political scientist. Politically appointee Territory Man-
agement National Director at MIDES. 
INTERVIEW N° 35 Sociologist. Political Scientist. Politically appointee mid-
dle-level official at Youth National Institute (MIDES). 
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INTERVIEW N° 36 Public servant. Technician at Cattle Raising Department 
of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 37 Politician. Politically appointee General Secretary of 
MEF. 
INTERVIEW N° 38 Politically appointed as Ambassador in China (MRREE). 
INTERVIEW N° 39 Public servant. Agricultural Engineer. Middle-level offi-
cial at Territory Management National Department 
(MIDES). 
INTERVIEW N° 40 Public servant. Economist. Technical advisor in Macro-
finances at MEF. 
INTERVIEW N° 41 Public servant. Veterinary surgeon. Middle-level official at 
Cattle Raising Department of MGAP. 
INTERVIEW N° 42 Political Scientist. Politically appointed Deputy National 
Director of the Territory Management Office of MIDES 

7DEOH$6XUYH\4XHVWLRQQDLUH
Name: 
Profession:
Formal qualifications: 
Current position: 
Previous positions: 
Main policy field of 
knowledge: 
Political affiliation: 
 
‘Within the public administration exist positions occupied by careerist civil servants, 
while others are filled by the Government authorities with a higher degree of discretion. 
For the purposes of this research, the latter will be called ‘political appointments’. I 
will ask you several questions about the way these political appointments are made 
within the public institution you know the most about.’  
6FRSH
1) Which is the proportion of political appointments at the Ministry X, 
regarding the following tiers? 
Higher level: ministerial advisors, Ambassadors, National Directors and 
their advisors, as other similar positions. 
Middle level: Managers, Directors of Divisions, Departments and territory 
offices, leaders of projects and programs, Coordinators of teams, Con-
sultants and similar positions. 
Lower level: technicians, street-level bureaucrats, territory operators and 
similar positions. 
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Tier/ 
Proportion 
All/Almost 
all (80-100%) 
Many 
(50-79%) 
Quite 
(10-49%) 
A few 
(1-9%) 
None 
(0%) 
High      
Middle      
Low      
 
:KR$SSRLQWV"
2) Despite the legal dispositions and the formal authority entailed by  
the public positions, who proposes the individuals to be politically ap-
pointed? 
 
A- Partido/party factions  
B- Office holders:  
 
President: B.1. In consultancy with party/party factions 
              B.2. Without any consultancy 
Ministers: B.3. In consultancy with party/party factions 
              B.4. Without any consultancy 
 
0RWLYDWLRQV
3) Which objectives are prioritized by politicians when discretionally 
appointing people in the different administrative tiers of the Ministry X? 
(Important/Not important) 
 
Tiers/ 
Motivations 
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G
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g 
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High      
Middle      
Low      
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4) Which capacities are prioritized among those being politically ap-
pointed in the different administrative tiers of the Ministry X? (Im-
portant/Not important) 
 
Tiers/ 
Capacities 
Technical capacity Political capacity 
Independent With 
partisan 
loyalty 
With 
personal 
trust 
Articulation, 
negotiation 
Electoral 
appealing 
High      
Middle      
Low      
 
0RGDOLW\
5) Do you think social and economic actors (e.g. companies, unions, civil 
society organisations) wield any power to influence the political ap-
pointment process? (Important/Not important) 
 
6) Which variations do you find between the presidential terms of Ta-
baré Vázquez and José Mujica regarding the political appointment prac-
tices? 
 
 


